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The Abu Nidal Terror Network: Organization, State Sponsors, and Commercial Enterprise

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A Research Paper

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July 1987

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The Abu Nidal Terror Network: Organization, State Sponsors, and Commercial Enterprise

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by the Counterterrorist
Center. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, Operations and Analysis
Group

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**The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponsors,
and Commercial Enterprise**

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Scope Note

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We now know that the group acquires significant revenue through the operation of its own network of commercial enterprises, which in turn depends on strong ties to Poland and East Germany. We have also acquired additional information concerning the group's structure and organization, its modus operandi, and its relationships with both friendly and hostile governments.

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**The Abu Nidal Terror Network:
Organization, State Sponsors,
and Commercial Enterprise**

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Summary

*Information available
as of 26 June 1987
was used in this report.*

The success of the Abu Nidal international terrorist organization (ANO) is sustained by the effective clandestine tradecraft it practices, the Middle Eastern states that sponsor its activities, and its widespread commercial infrastructure.

ANO founder Sabri al-Banna officially titled his organization Fatah—Revolutionary Council and patterned its structure after Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah. Banna left Fatah in the 1970s after a disagreement over the use of terrorist tactics outside Israel and the occupied territories, and he seeks to compete with 'Arafat for the loyalty of Palestinian Arabs. Banna espouses the use of violence against Israel, Israel's Western supporters, Arab governments willing to negotiate with Israel, and any Arab leader, including PLO members, that he believes temporizes on the need to destroy the Israeli state.

State sponsors of the ANO provide logistic support, training facilities, financial backing, weapons, documents, and safehaven, without which the organization would have difficulty operating effectively outside the Middle East. Iraq was the major ANO patron until 1983; subsequently, Syria and now Libya provide most of its outside support. In return for such assistance, the ANO undertakes some operations at the behest of its patrons, although in general the ANO pursues its own agenda.

The ANO has established a commercial network in Europe and the Middle East that supplements income received from state sponsors and also is available to support operations. Through companies in East Germany and Poland, the ANO engages in gray-arms sales and illegal technology transfer that aid both the ANO and the East European states. The ANO has reached agreements with these states, and also with Yugoslavia, that permit it to maintain a presence in return for a promise not to stage terrorist attacks on the soil of these states or against their interests elsewhere.

ANO attacks have been increasingly violent and designed to cause a maximum number of casualties, often innocent civilians. The ANO has threatened retaliation against states that hold its members prisoner, including the United States. It has followed through on such threats against the United Kingdom.

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The Abu Nidal Terror Network: Organization, State Sponsors, and Commercial Enterprise (u)

Introduction

The Abu Nidal organization (ANO)¹ is among the most dangerous of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups, carefully planning its operations and maintaining tight compartmentation. The clandestine cadres of the ANO may number as many as 400, organized in small cells worldwide. There is also a support structure of several hundred more, drawn primarily from Palestinian students around the world; the ANO has a militia in Lebanon that is growing as it actively recruits from other Palestinian organizations.

The ANO has conducted about 90 terrorist attacks since its inception in 1974—almost half of them since the beginning of 1984 (see appendix). At least 300 people have died and more than 575 have been wounded in ANO attacks. Despite its Middle Eastern roots, the ANO has conducted almost three-fourths of its attacks outside the Middle East, almost two-thirds of them in Western Europe. It has staged attacks in over 20 countries on three continents and has cells in cities in many countries outside the Middle East (see foldout map in back).

The ANO claims that its enemies are Israel and Israel's supporters, as well as moderate Arab governments and leaders, whom it considers traitors. However, the victims of the ANO's indiscriminate terror are often innocent bystanders and are of nationalities other than the intended target (see tables 1 and 2). Among the most recent examples are:

- The attempted hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan, on 5 September 1986, left 21 dead—14 Indians, three Pakistanis, two Mexicans, and two Americans.

¹ Because the group is most commonly referred to as the Abu Nidal organization, the initials ANO will be used in this paper as a matter of convenience.



Figure 1. Rome, Italy, 27 December 1985. Italian security officials survey the scene in the aftermath of the ANO attack on the El Al ticket counter in the terminal of Fiumicino Airport; 12 victims died.

- The simultaneous attacks on El Al ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December 1985 left more than a dozen dead—five Americans, three Greeks, two Mexicans, two Israelis, one Algerian, and one Austrian.

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ANO Covernames

The Abu Nidal organization has used numerous covernames when claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks, including:

Black June—The group adopted this name in 1976 to commemorate the month in which the Syrian Army invaded Lebanon on the side of the Christian right against the Muslim left and its Palestinian allies. Under this name, the ANO in 1978 began assassinating mainstream Fatah targets. The ANO evidently abandoned this covername after it moved its headquarters from Baghdad to Damascus in 1983.

Al-Asifa (The Storm)—The ANO has adopted much of the nomenclature of PLO Chairman 'Arafat's Fatah organization (see also *Black September*). The ANO used this name—which also applies to the military wing of 'Arafat's Fatah—until 1982 when claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks.

Arab Revolutionary Brigades—The ANO began using this name in 1982. Although it is generally used for attacks against Persian Gulf targets, it was also used when claiming attacks against Jordanian

targets in 1983 and in the communique that claimed responsibility (with Egypt's Revolution) for the Egyptair hijacking in November 1985.

Black September—The ANO began using this name in 1984 in its claims for attacks against Jordanian and Palestinian targets. The name cleverly serves a dual role. First, it reminds Palestinians that 'Arafat disbanded his group of the same name in 1974 and has since pursued more moderate policies. ('Arafat's Black September organization was named after the month in 1970 that marked the beginning of King Hussein's crackdown on Palestinian organizations, which eventually led to their expulsion from Jordan.) Second, the name commemorates the month in 1982 when Lebanese forces massacred hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM)—The ANO began using this name in 1984 as its signature for attacks against British targets. The attacks were designed to force the British Government to release imprisoned ANO members, but they did not achieve their desired objective.

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- The Egyptair hijacking on 23 November 1985 ultimately cost the lives of 56 passengers, including 12 Egyptians, 12 Greeks, 11 Filipinos, eight Palestinians, two Canadians, two Israelis, and one American

The official name of the ANO is Fatah–Revolutionary Council. The ANO often employs this name when attacking Israeli targets, but it has also used a number of covernames (see inset) when claiming responsibility for its terrorist attacks. The covernames are intended to confuse the enemy—namely, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the intelligence services of other governments—so that the true perpetrators of the terrorist attacks are not easily identified.

The ANO maintains a formal organizational structure patterned after, but more secretive than, that of Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah organization—reflecting the fact that it considers itself the “real” Fatah. The group's financing comes from its own commercial network as well as from state sponsors. Some companies in its commercial network are involved in gray-arms deals with Warsaw Pact states.

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The Man, the Organization, Its Operating Principles

The organization is most commonly referred to as Abu Nidal from the nom de guerre of its leader, Sabri al-Banna, who created it from elements that broke

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Table 1
Nationalities of ANO Victims, 1985-87 ^a

Country/Nationality	Wounded	Dead
Algeria	0	1
Argentina	1	0
Australia	2	0
Austria	3	1
Canada	0	2
Egypt	4	12
Greece	11	15
India	0	14
Iran	2	0
Israel	3	6
Italy	21	2
Jordan	2	1
Kuwait	90	8
Mexico	0	4
Nigeria	3	0
Pakistan	2	3
Palestinian	3	10
Philippines	3	11
Spain	25	1
Turkey	6	20
United Kingdom	34	0
United States	50	8
West Germany	2	0

^a Data are incomplete. At least 188 more were killed or wounded, but their nationalities are unreported.

away from Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah organization in the 1970s. The ANO is committed to the destruction of the state of Israel and the use of violence to abort any political or diplomatic efforts that might reconcile Israel and the Arab states. The ANO considers any who choose negotiation to be traitors and directs terrorist attacks against PLO officials, including 'Arafat, when they move in that direction. Banna was sentenced to death in absentia by the Fatah command in 1974 for planning the murder of 'Arafat and other PLO officials, including Abu Iyad, one of 'Arafat's



Figure 2. Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal)

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confidants. ANO members have attacked PLO officials or offices in London, Kuwait, Paris, Islamabad, Brussels, Rome, Lisbon, Athens, Ankara, and Belgrade, killing at least 11 leading Fatah members.

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Banna has publicly threatened Western and moderate Arab nations with terrorism and assassination for what he sees as their part in preventing a Palestinian homeland. The ANO has called for the destruction of moderate, or, in its terms, "reactionary" Arab governments. Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt have been prominent on the ANO's target list, and each has suffered a number of attacks on its officials, airliners, and other interests throughout the Middle East and Europe. The ANO has also attacked US and British targets, striking civilian targets such as airlines and hotels, as well as diplomats—including the British Deputy High Commissioner in Bombay, whom it murdered in 1984. The ANO staged a series of attacks against Jordanian targets in 1983-85, when Jordan's King Hussein joined PLO Chairman 'Arafat in efforts to revive Middle Eastern peace negotiations

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Banna formed his organization in 1974, largely in response to 'Arafat's professed ban on PLO participation in terrorist attacks outside Israel and the occupied territories. Banna—who was the PLO representative in Baghdad at the time—disagreed, arguing that any operation that advances the Palestinian cause is justifiable and any location is acceptable.

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Table 2
Nationalities of Victims of Selected
Abu Nidal Attacks, 1985-86

Locale/Date	Target	Nationalities of Known Victims	Wounded	Dead
Rome, Italy—21 March 1985	Royal Jordanian Airline office	Italian	1	0
		Jordanian	1	0
Athens, Greece—21 March 1985	Royal Jordanian Airline office	Greek	2	0
		Jordanian	1	0
Madrid, Spain—1 July 1985	British Airways ticket office	Spanish	24	1
		British	1	0
		American	2	0
Kuwait City, Kuwait—11 July 1985	Two cafes	Kuwaiti	89	8
Athens, Greece—8 August 1985	London Hotel	Greek	4	0
		Iranian	2	0
		British	7	0
Athens, Greece—3 September 1985	Glyfada Hotel	British	19	0
Rome, Italy—16 September 1985	Cafe de Paris	Argentine	1	0
		Australian	2	0
		Italian	20	0
		Spanish	1	0
		British	3	0
		American	9	0
		West German	2	0
Rome, Italy—25 September 1985	British Airways office	British	3	0
		Unknown	11	1
Malta—23-24 November 1985	Egyptair Flight 648 hijacking	Canadian	0	2
		Egyptian	4	12
		Filipino	3	11
		Greek	5	12
		Israeli	1	2
		Palestinian	3	8
		American	2	1
		Unknown	5	8
Vienna, Austria—27 December 1985	El Al counter, Vienna's Schwechat Airport	Austrian	3	1
		Israeli	0	1
		Nigerian	3	0
		American	2	0
		Unknown	31	0
Rome, Italy—27 December 1985	El Al counter, Rome's Fiumicino Airport	Algerian	0	1
		Greek	0	3
		Israeli	2	1
		Mexican	0	2
		American	15	5
		Unknown	55	0
Karachi, Pakistan—5 September 1986	Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking	Indian	0	14
		Mexican	0	2
		Pakistani	2	3
		British	1	0
		American	20	2
		Unknown	77	0
Istanbul, Turkey—6 September 1986	Neve Shalom synagogue	Israeli	0	2
		Turkish	6	20

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Figure 3. Valletta, Malta, 24 November 1985. Egyptian commandos search among the surviving passengers of Egyptair Flight 648 for the hijackers. The incident claimed 56 victims.

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These radical views found favor with the Iraqi regime. Banna's close ties to Iraqi intelligence proved beneficial; Baghdad provided Banna with a base for his operations and helped him create the Fatah—Revolutionary Council. By choosing this name, Banna broadcast his claim that his organization, rather than the one led by 'Arafat, was the legitimate Fatah. He has similarly created an organizational structure with titles that mirror 'Arafat's Fatah. [REDACTED]

Although most noted for his international terrorist network, Banna wants to supplant 'Arafat's organization as the Palestinian people's main focus of allegiance. In recent months the ANO has renewed its attention to intra-Palestinian politics. Although Banna remains under death sentence by 'Arafat's Fatah, the ANO joined preliminary sessions for the Palestine National Council in Algiers in April 1987. The ANO has also begun building a militia within the

refugee camps in Lebanon. These efforts are in addition to—not a substitute for—Banna's basic strategy of using violence and terrorism to bring down Israel and punish any who support or negotiate with its government. [REDACTED]

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Biographic information on Sabri al-Banna is scarce and often conflicting, but the following elements are common to most accounts. He was born in 1937 into a (b)(3) large, prosperous family in Jaffa, Palestine. According to his brother, a prosperous West Bank merchant, the family ensured that all the boys received a good education at private schools. The family claims to have lost its lands in 1948 and fled to a UN relief camp. Banna joined 'Arafat's Fatah in 1967, where his patron reportedly was Abu Iyad [REDACTED] (b)(3)

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Banna described his group's goals and ideology in an interview: "Total destruction of the Zionist entity. Participation in Arab unity. The path of Pan-Arabism. Building a democratic people's regime in which Palestine is a homeland. In other words, our struggle is for the liberation of Palestine, in which we wish to establish a secular democratic state." Banna's operating philosophy is simple and constant—violence is his preferred tool. [redacted]

The Group's Structure ²

Banna directly controls and guides the ANO. He is assisted by a small Politburo, of about 10 persons, that he created in 1985 to supervise daily operations and ensure that his policies are carried out. The highest administrative body and theoretically the principal decisionmaking organ is the 27-member Central Committee that selects department leaders and assigns them their responsibilities. Its members include the Politburo plus additional prominent persons from the organization. Ideological guidance, indoctrination, and discipline are provided by the Revolutionary Council of about 40 members, including all members of the Central Committee. The ANO has maintained offices in Libya and Syria. Banna most often is found in Tripoli, Libya, although he maintains a residence in Warsaw, Poland, and spends time at other locations [redacted]

The ANO's structure comprises six departments and a military office (see foldout chart in back). The Organization Department appears to handle relations with foreign governments and liaison with student movements, unions, and other mass organizations. It coordinates with operational elements abroad through its six regional committees. The Finance and Economic Department manages income and investments from the ANO's commercial activities and probably also is responsible for general accounting and payroll requirements for the organization. Chief financial officer Samir Hasan Najm al-Din (a.k.a. Samir Najmeddin) also heads the ANO commercial network. [redacted]

The Information Department performs security and intelligence functions and probably also serves as the organization's locus for preparation and implementation of terrorist operations. Its three subunits are responsible for: performing counterintelligence, including investigations of ANO members suspected of committing security infractions; collecting targeting and casing information for potential operations; and conducting terrorist operations. [redacted]

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The Political Department is the overt arm of the ANO. It performs liaison and propaganda functions. This department publishes *Filastin al-Thawra*, the ANO's glossy international newsweekly, which contains items of interest to Palestinians. It is distributed to ANO members around the world, often clandestinely, because it is banned in many Arab and other countries. The Political Department also produces *al-Tariq*, an internal, typewritten document reportedly written by Sabri al-Banna. *Al-Tariq* contains policy recommendations, future plans, ideological discussions, internal criticism, and reports on personnel matters. It is tightly held, and members who are allowed to read it may not retain it. In recent months, the Political Department may have achieved increased prominence because the ANO has begun emphasizing its political agenda as a part of its maneuvers within the Palestinian movement, particularly in the wake of the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers. [redacted]

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The Lebanon Affairs Department is responsible for ANO activities in Lebanon and relations with the various organizations and movements in the country. It oversees the five military districts into which the ANO divides responsibility for Lebanon. It was formed in early 1986 because of the growing importance of Lebanon, particularly the south, as a base of operations. The department also assumed responsibility for all ANO military activities in the country from the former Military Department, which was relegated to an office because of an internal ANO political squabble. The prominence of ANO armed units in the camps' war in Lebanon has undoubtedly raised the importance of the Lebanon Affairs Department within the overall organization. [redacted]

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
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Figure 4. Cover page of Al-Tariq, ANO's internal, policy magazine. The magazine is disseminated on a highly restricted basis, and members may not retain copies. [redacted]

Training and Operations

Despite increased attention to Palestinian politics and to military affairs in Lebanon, the ANO's primary tool against Israel and within the Palestinian movement remains its terrorist apparatus. ANO terrorist operatives are carefully screened and trained. The ANO does not require large military training camps, although operatives have received paramilitary-style training at camps in Lebanon and Syria. Some of these camps are controlled by other organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which use the camps to train Palestinian militias for urban guerrilla warfare. Many of the weapons and techniques are equally applicable to terrorist operations. ANO operatives at such camps have been trained in the use of small arms, grenades, and other weaponry for terrorist operations. Among the camps that the ANO has used to train its operatives are the PFLP-GC camp at Ayn Sahab, north of Damascus;



Figure 5. ANO's internal publication, Al-Tariq, carries this version of the emblem used by 'Arafat's Fatah on page two of each issue. The same emblem is also used on the letterhead of ANO correspondence [redacted]

an installation near the village of Al Hulwah, Lebanon, close to the Syrian border; several camps near an installation near the village of Al Hulwah, Lebanon, close to the Syrian border; several camps near 'Ayta al Fukhkhar in Lebanon's Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley); and another near Al Raudah, also in the Bekaa Valley. [redacted]

An important component of ANO training is political indoctrination, with heavy stress on loyalty and obedience to the organization. It is clearly understood that "defectors" will be killed. Each ANO member reportedly signs a statement upon entry into the organization that he understands and accepts that he will be

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executed if he is discovered to have contacts with the enemy. In 1986 the ANO killed a senior member in Lebanon because he was suspected of betraying the organization to European authorities. [redacted]

The ANO leadership carefully screens all recruits. Each prospective member reportedly first fills out an application form. This form requests the individual's name, date and place of birth, parents' full names, siblings' full names, and a work history. If the applicant or any member of his family has been imprisoned, the form requests a full description of the events surrounding the arrest. The applicant is also required to provide a brief biography and to describe his reasons for wanting to become an ANO member. [redacted]

The ANO observes strict rules of compartmentation. It drills into its operatives the need for careful tradecraft, including the use of passwords, codes, aliases, emergency contact instructions, and other accoutrements of a clandestine organization. Security and loyalty are enhanced by the extended kinship ties that link many ANO operatives. Manipulating family loyalties provides an entree for recruitment as well as a potential support structure for operations beyond the Middle East [redacted]

From its inception, the ANO has demonstrated an ability to operate beyond the Middle East; it launched one of its earliest attacks in Pakistan in 1976. The organization has established a clandestine infrastructure that encompasses the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. It sends operatives to a city to establish cover, often as students or small businessmen. These operatives may or may not know other ANO members in the local network. They gather intelligence about potential targets, particularly those associated with Israel and its supporters, moderate Arab governments, and rivals in the Palestinian movement. They acquire safehouses and surveil institutions associated with the targeted individuals. They also scout local Palestinians as potential recruits or supporters. [redacted]

Members of ANO cells are not generally used to carry out terrorist attacks within their host country; they may provide only the on-the-ground support network. In many instances the "hit team" comes

from outside solely to perform the operation. A senior ANO operative, who usually also comes from outside, acts as the overall controller but does not participate in the actual operation. Individual members of the operational team probably do not know the full details of the attack plan. As a result, if operatives are seized during or after the attack, they cannot provide sufficient details to lead the investigators back to the local cell or other parts of the ANO network. [redacted]

The Importance of Patron States

The ANO's ability to take advantage of its worldwide clandestine infrastructure to conduct terrorist operations is greatly enhanced by support from Middle Eastern governments, initially Iraq and, more recently, Syria and Libya. Banna's relationship with his patrons waxes and wanes, depending on his view of the state's utility to the ANO and the state's perception of the ANO's usefulness to its own international political agenda. For example, at a 1983 ANO meeting, Banna noted that Syria's policies are likely to be inconsistent. A senior ANO leader said in 1985 that the organization must put up with a certain amount of inconsistency from Syria because a break in relations would cause the ANO to lose its ability to operate in Lebanon. Banna does not completely trust any one country; as a result, the ANO never stations its entire leadership in one place. [redacted]

In return for safehaven, logistic support, and financial assistance that enables Banna to pursue his own agenda, the ANO will conduct certain operations on behalf of its patrons. At its inception, the ANO depended heavily on Iraq, and the ANO's terrorist operations during this period served as a tool to further Iraq's interests in the continuing intra-Arab struggle. When Iraq subsequently needed to find supporters in its fight against Iran, Baghdad found it prudent to be more discreet about its relations with terrorists. It forced Banna to move his operations out of Baghdad in 1983. [redacted]

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After the ANO was forced out of Iraq, Syria became an important supporter. Damascus has provided the ANO with important logistic support, allowing it to maintain offices in Damascus until June 1987 and training facilities in Syria and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Syria has also provided the ANO with travel documents and permitted ANO operatives to transit Damascus when departing on missions. According to the lone surviving terrorist from the 1985 Rome airport massacre, members of the four-man hit team were trained in Syrian-occupied Lebanon and traveled to Damascus, where they remained for four days making final preparations for the attack. []

The ANO's move to Syria coincided with a dramatic increase in its terrorist attacks. Between 1983 and 1986, the ANO struck at US, British, pro-'Arafat Palestinian, moderate Arab, and Israeli targets. Between late 1983 and late 1985, the ANO conducted 16 attacks against Jordanian targets—including the murder of Jordanian diplomats in Bucharest and Ankara—as part of a Syrian campaign to disrupt Jordanian initiatives in the Middle Eastern peace process. The attacks against the Jordanians ceased following a Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement. []

Syria's President Assad shut down ANO's offices in Damascus in early June 1987. It is not known whether this crackdown extends to the ANO-associated camps in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. ANO members formerly based in Damascus have relocated to Lebanon, Libya, and other areas where the organization has an established infrastructure. The ANO will almost certainly maintain a covert apparatus inside Syria. []

Another major ANO supporter is Libya. The ANO's relationship with Libya has intensified since about 1985. The Libyan press reports that Banna met with senior officials in Libya at least three times in 1985. Libya provides training assistance, safehaven, and financial support to the ANO. Tripoli gives the ANO close support for selected operations as well. In September 1985 an ANO operative was arrested in London after he was seen collecting four handgrenades in a bag from a Libyan contact. Libya is believed to have been involved in the bloody hijacking by ANO of Egyptair Flight 648 in November 1985, and Tripoli

provided the passports to ANO members who attacked the El Al counter at the Vienna airport in December that same year. Libya also provided assistance to operatives involved in the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in September 1986. []

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The relationship with Libya is mutually beneficial because the ANO's widespread terrorist operations complement Qadhafi's radical anti-Western program. Qadhafi uses terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy and willingly supports groups that use terrorist tactics, whether or not their targets or goals are related to Middle Eastern issues. Tripoli operates numerous training camps for foreign dissident groups. These camps have provided instruction in explosive devices; hijackings, assassinations, and various commando and guerrilla operations. Libya is willing to store arms and explosives in its diplomatic establishments, to send weapons and other equipment through its diplomatic pouches, and to employ its national airline to provide logistic support and cover for terrorist operatives. Weapons recovered following several Abu Nidal terrorist incidents—including the Rome and Vienna airport attacks—were originally sold to Libya and passed on to the terrorist group []

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Financing and Facilitating Terrorist Operations

The ANO operates a network of commercial businesses in several Middle Eastern and European cities, with key branches in two Warsaw Pact countries (see foldout map and photos in back). For a period in 1983-84, after Banna was forced to leave Iraq, these companies were an important source of financial support for the ANO. These companies not only provide revenue for the group's activities but also can be used for operational support. With such a network in place, clandestine ANO terrorists have access to a readymade mechanism to move and hide funds; to buy, ship, and cache weapons; to arrange meetings; and to serve as accommodation addresses. ANO company personnel are thus available to perform a wide range of terrorist support functions worldwide under commercial cover if called on to do so. []

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Figure 6. Samir Najm al-Din has maintained his Warsaw residence in this luxury high-rise apartment building on Ulica Bagno. It is one block from the Bulgarian Culture and Information Center, in the shadow of the Palace of Culture and Science, an ugly Stalinesque building that dominates the Warsaw skyline.

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The ANO commercial network comprises several businesses created over the past seven years with the long-term goal of establishing legitimate trading enterprises in various countries, gaining experience in commercial trade, and making a profit for the group. Such profits permit the organization some freedom of operation beyond the control of its state benefactors. Most of the companies deal in a variety of manufactured goods that are sold primarily to Arab countries, but a key segment of the network deals extensively in the international arms market, with assistance from gray-arms dealers and certain Warsaw Pact countries.

The general manager of the commercial network and the principal agent in gray-arms transactions is Samir Hasan Najm al-Din. He directs many of the ANO's commercial activities, both licit and illicit, from his offices in the INTRACO building in Warsaw, Poland. He brokered arms sales on behalf of Warsaw Pact and Middle Eastern governments even before the current ANO companies were established, and commissions from such deals are a continuing source of income for the ANO. Najm al-Din has maintained a permanent residence in Warsaw at 3 Ulica Bagno, apartment 24, since at least 1983.

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The managers of the ANO's several companies report to the Board of Directors, which includes Sabri al-Banna; his de facto deputy for commercial matters, Samir Najm al-Din; financial manager Shakir Farhan; and a fourth official named Kamal Hasan Khalil. Organizationally, the Board of Directors falls under the purview of the ANO's Finance and Economic Department. In reality, the commercial network is run by Najm al-Din, who reports directly to Banna. [redacted]

Najm al-Din oversees all of the companies' records at his Warsaw office. He maintains a general account at a major West European bank from which he transfers money to individual company accounts at local banks. He maintains joint control of each company's bank accounts along with the company manager and is responsible for forwarding all major contracts to Banna for final approval. [redacted]

Members of the ANO commercial sector generally do not interact with those involved in its political and terrorist operations. The managers of the ANO companies are primarily businessmen. This facilitates interaction with potential clients and provides plausible denial to businessmen or governments that are aware that the companies are controlled by ANO, but would be embarrassed should their involvement with these enterprises be publicized. [redacted]

Although ANO businessmen are not members of the terrorist wing of the organization, the group's leadership considers them integral members of the ANO, and they must undergo the same stringent screening process as terrorist operatives. They regularly receive issues of ANO publications, including the newsmagazine *Filastin al-Thawra* and the internal policy document *al-Tariq*. They attend meetings hosted by senior ANO officials in which they are briefed on current issues of interest and are reminded of their contribution to the ANO cause. [redacted]

Some of the businessmen began their ANO careers as support operatives for terrorist operations before moving to one of the commercial enterprises. For example, the manager of the ANO commercial enterprise in Athens, Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah, joined the ANO in the 1970s at an early age. In late 1984, a



Figure 7. Mustafa Murad (Abu Nizar) [redacted]

senior ANO officer, Abu Fuwayris, sent him to do clandestine work in Athens. ANO's chief of operations Mustafa Murad subsequently assigned Hamadah to manage the ANO company in Athens. Given this background, it is likely that Hamadah was occasionally tapped to perform terrorist support functions, using his business as cover. [redacted]

It is the ANO's policy to isolate its commercial endeavors from its terrorist infrastructure, but ANO businessmen are occasionally asked to provide operational support such as delivering messages or temporarily storing weapons. By virtue of their seniority, loyalty, and access, senior officials within the ANO commercial network, such as Najm al-Din, are likely to be even more knowledgeable about specific ANO terrorist operations and plans. [redacted]

Most of the ANO companies are import-export firms that trade in a variety of consumer goods, but one, SAS, also trades heavily in weapons. Among the companies in the ANO commercial network are:

- **SAS Foreign Trade And Investment Company.** SAS was established in 1983 and is headquartered in Warsaw. SAS stands for Samir-Adnan-Shakir, the first names of three former or current officials in the ANO economic sector—Samir Najm al-Din, Adnan Zayit, and Shakir Farhan. It is a self-described international organization involved in general trading, marketing, investments, and construction. Since

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
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Figure 8. The SAS Company logo appears prominently on the entrance door of the INTRACO building in Warsaw [redacted]

the early 1980s, however, Najm al-Din and other SAS Company representatives have negotiated a number of deals to provide embargoed arms to Iran, Iraq, and Zimbabwe. Najm al-Din is the director and general manager of SAS, which is the most profitable ANO company.

- **Zibado Foreign Trade and Consultants Company.** The ANO originally opened the Zibado Company in Limassol, Cyprus, in September 1983. The organization subsequently decided that it did not require two companies operating in Cyprus, so it closed Zibado in early 1984. The ANO established the Zibado Company headquarters in East Berlin in March 1984. The East Berlin office had three employees before it closed in late 1986—the manager, Kamal Hasan Khalil; an East German named Hans Hoffmann; and an East German secretary. It was managed by Kamal Hasan Khalil. Zibado Company officials dealt directly with Guenther Haussman, managing director for exports in IMES, which is an East German Government foreign trade organization active in the arms trade. Zibado claimed to be able to deliver a wide range of goods including entire industrial plants, building machines and materials, research laboratories, pianos, livestock, and frozen seafood. The Zibado Company established a branch in Damascus in 1983. It is located on the fifth floor of the Nahas Building, on Abu Sa'id

Street, and is managed by Abdullah Salah (a.k.a. Abu Hisham). The Damascus branch operates independently from the main office in East Berlin and has served as an office for ANO financial director Shakir Farhan.

- **Al Noor, Ltd.** The company was registered in Athens, Greece, in 1983. It has traded mainly in foodstuffs, leather goods, shoes, arak, clothes, and mineral water. Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah managed the firm, which had three employees—Hamadah, his wife, and a Greek secretary. Al Noor may have closed or moved its Athens office in early 1987.

- **Al Reem Trading, Ltd. (formerly Dirar, Ltd.).** Al Reem was established in Nicosia, Cyprus, in February 1980. It is a self-described Arab trading company that engages in general trading, investments, and consulting. Muhammad Salah Eddin 'Abd al-Fattah manages the company and employs his wife and a Cypriot secretary. Al Reem may have closed or moved its Nicosia office in early 1987.

- **Al Manar Restaurant.** Established in Nicosia, Cyprus, in 1981, the restaurant went out of business in 1986. Advertisements described it as the first Arabic restaurant in Nicosia. The restaurant was managed by Muhammad Salah Eddin 'Abd al-Fattah, who has and may still run the Al Reem company. The Abu Nidal group's original plan was to open additional Al Manar restaurants in Vienna, Athens, and Poland. It appears that this plan was postponed or abandoned after the closing of the restaurant in Nicosia.

- **International Marketing Corporation (IMC).** The company was established in 1983 and is directed by Musa Rashid Ramadan in Kuwait.

- **Intermador.** The Intermador Company was established by the ANO in late 1984 and is a commercial trader of containers. Company directors include Polish businessman Andrzej Urbaniak and ANO member Ibrahim al-Abid. [redacted]

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Banna prefers to keep his group's financial assets in West European banks because political stability ensures a return on his investment. Most of the financial transactions among the companies are run through a single branch of the Luxembourg-based Bank of Credit and Commerce International. Najm al-Din controls the account and deals directly with the branch manager. Each company also maintains at least one bank account in a local bank to which operating funds are transferred from the central account. (S NF)

The ANO's Finance and Economic Department has established a structured apparatus for managing day-to-day affairs of the organization's commercial network. A member of the Board of Directors visits each of the companies monthly. Financial manager Shakir Farhan audits the accounts of each company every three months. The Board of Directors imposes a strict system of fixed expenditures for travel, office expenses, and monthly office budgets. []

The Importance of Eastern Europe

The ANO's relations with individual East European governments are beneficial to both sides. The ANO obtains bases for commercial activities, propaganda, and recruitment; access to weapons and training; and entree into Western Europe for operations. Depending on the nature of their arrangements with the ANO, the East European governments obtain hard currency, access to embargoed weapons, and/or guarantees against ANO's terrorist activities on their soil. []

A salient feature of the commercial network is its intricate relationship with Poland and East Germany. ANO commercial organizations in Warsaw (SAS Foreign Trade and Investment), and in East Berlin (Zibado), have been staffed not only by ANO commercial representatives, but also by Polish and East German nationals who act as brokers between government export companies and foreign buyers. They have dealt heavily but not exclusively in arms trading in the Middle East and Africa. The SAS Company in Warsaw forms the hub of much of this activity. []

SAS works closely with the official Polish arms exporter, CENZIN, to broker arms transfers for the Polish Government. Andrzej Marchewka is the chief Polish contact for SAS commercial activities. He functions both as a representative of CENZIN and as the manager of the SAS office. He has negotiated a number of weapons deals for SAS with Middle Eastern governments. He is believed to be a Polish intelligence official, and the ease with which he expedites visas and customs clearance for ANO travelers to Warsaw suggests close ties to Polish security officials. Najm al-Din pays \$600 per month for Marchewka's services. He pays \$500 to Marchewka's Polish employees who, in turn, pay Marchewka in local currency, and he directly pays Marchewka \$100 (in US currency). []

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The ANO has maintained a close commercial relationship with East German foreign trade organizations in three areas: manufactured goods, weapons, and embargoed technology. Unlike SAS, which is the ANO's focal point for all business deals in Poland, Zibado was responsible only for trade in manufactured goods and it dealt directly with East German manufacturing firms. Najm al-Din personally handled the weapons and technology transactions, sometimes with the assistance of the Zibado Company manager. For these, he dealt directly with IMES, a state-run foreign trade organization primarily responsible for the sale of weapons and other military equipment. East German officials have also turned to the ANO commercial network for assistance in establishing contacts in several African and Middle Eastern markets that the East Germans have not otherwise been able to penetrate. []

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In Warsaw and East Berlin, the local employees and the export firms with which the ANO deals have extensive ties to responsible party, government, and commercial officials. These employees and local export firms also have ties to high-level intelligence services, which facilitate the group's travel and dealings with state bureaucracies. []

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Polish and East German connections help the ANO in other areas as well. After his expulsion from Iraq in 1983, Banna went to Poland. He may have resided in Poland from late 1983 until early 1985, and he continues to maintain a residence in Warsaw, which he may occasionally visit. The ANO holds general business meetings in Warsaw; Banna presided over two such meetings in 1983 and 1984. In December 1983 meetings were held at the Solec Hotel and at the Novotel Hotel near Warsaw's airport. In September 1984 the meetings were held again at the Novotel Hotel. []

The ANO's ties to Poland date to at least 1979. Banna and the Polish Government entered an agreement whereby the ANO pledged not to undertake terrorist activities on Polish soil or against Polish interests in return for freedom to conduct ANO propaganda activities in Poland and for scholarships for ANO members. A senior official of the Polish Ministry of Education met the first group of ANO students at the Warsaw airport. The ANO continues sending students to Poland each year and maintains a liaison officer in Warsaw—Najah 'Abd-al-'Afu Muhammad 'Adas, himself a former student there—to oversee the scholarship program. []

The East German Government reached a similar arrangement with Banna in early 1983. Again, the reciprocal agreement involved a pledge by the ANO not to undertake operations in East Germany or against East German interests abroad in return for government scholarships and training. The first group of 15 ANO members arrived in January 1984 for training in "ideology and culture"; Isam 'Abd al-Rahim Asad Maraqa, now ANO deputy secretary general, led the group. In 1985 an ANO group received military training in East Germany. The East Germans have also provided "security training" that includes courses on casing a target, detecting surveillance, and assembling explosives. []

The ANO liaison representative in East Berlin deals with an official of the East German Ministry of State Security responsible for training foreign liberation movements if the issue is a routine training matter. Otherwise, he talks directly with the assistant to the

State Security Minister and member of the Communist party committee responsible for the training of foreign liberation movements []

Political aspects of the ANO's relations with these Warsaw Pact countries are apparently handled personally by Banna, or his designated representative, who travels periodically to Warsaw and East Berlin. []

Both East Germany and Poland deny any connection with the ANO. The Polish Government publicly denied in late September 1986 that Banna had ever been in Poland, asserted that he would not be allowed to enter the country in the future, and printed anti-ANO stories in the official media. There is no evidence, however, that Warsaw or East Berlin restricted its commercial dealings with the ANO or Najm al-Din. []

The ANO's relations with Poland and East Germany are mutually beneficial. Officials of these states apparently calculated that their ties to the ANO are too deeply concealed to be discovered. The prospect of earning hard currency from deals with the ANO is clearly an important motivating factor for close ties between Warsaw, East Berlin, and the ANO commercial infrastructure. The East Germans and the Poles use these companies as intermediaries to sell their arms internationally. This disguises the identity of the original seller from the buyer, allowing Warsaw Pact officials plausible denial of direct involvement in potentially embarrassing arms transfers. []

There are also reports that ANO members have traveled to and/or held meetings in other Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia, as well as maintained official contact with them. In the past several years Banna has spent some time in Budapest, and at least one of the general ANO business meetings was held there in April 1984. Access to Yugoslavia not only provides the ANO with a valuable transit area, but it is also a place where the group can openly disseminate propaganda and recruit operatives from among the local Arab student community. The ANO reportedly has used the Yugoslav postal system to distribute its magazine *Filastin al-Thawra*. []

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The ANO reached an agreement with Yugoslavia in 1981 by which Belgrade would permit the ANO to conduct organizational and propaganda activities in Yugoslavia in return for an ANO pledge not to conduct operations on Yugoslav territory or against Yugoslav interests. Yugoslavia initiated contacts with the ANO following a series of incidents involving ANO terrorist attacks against PLO officials in Yugoslavia. The ANO was permitted to maintain a liaison officer in Belgrade who had direct contact with Yugoslav intelligence officials. Banna attended a senior-level meeting in Belgrade to finalize the agreement. Although the ANO continues to maintain a presence in Yugoslavia, it is not certain that the group currently maintains an official liaison relationship with representatives of the Yugoslav Government.

All of the East European states are concerned about preventing terrorist acts on their home turf. Contacts with known terrorists not only increase the influence that security services may be able to exercise but also allow them to develop intelligence about events in the Middle East that could be politically useful.

Gray-Arms Marketeer

The ANO's economic network combined with its close ties to Warsaw Pact countries has enabled the organization to become an important participant in the international gray-arms market. Brokering arms for Warsaw Pact and Middle Eastern governments not only provides steady income for the organization, but also gives it an independent source of equipment, particularly the small arms that are the weapons of choice for terrorists around the world. Among the weapons available to the ANO through its gray-arms dealings are pistols, submachine guns, assault and sniper rifles, as well as such items as man-portable antitank and antiaircraft weapons that terrorists usually can acquire only through the beneficence of a state supporter. The ANO is also in a position to act as a middleman between Warsaw Pact governments and other terrorist groups seeking to acquire weapons. By using the group's network of ostensibly legitimate trading companies, these governments can distance

themselves from the terrorist end user, giving them plausible deniability if their arms are used in terrorist operations

The focal point for the ANO's gray-arms deals is the SAS Foreign Trade and Investment Company, headquartered in Warsaw. As manager of this company, Samir Najm al-Din is the key intermediary in the ANO's international arms dealings. Working through the Warsaw office and a sister company in East Berlin, Najm al-Din has facilitated a series of deals that work to the advantage of Warsaw Pact and Middle Eastern states, as well as to the ANO itself:

- In 1986 Najm al-Din assisted East Germany in obtaining 115 Enfield antiriot weapons from the United Kingdom by designating an African country on the end user certificate. The shipment was diverted to East Germany once it reached Rotterdam. The East German Government purchased 100 of the weapons, and the remainder were retained by the ANO.
- In 1984 Najm al-Din handled a contract worth \$500,000 under which East Germany sent more than 4,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles to Libya. The rifles were shipped via Poland in order to conceal East German involvement in the transaction.
- In 1985 Najm al-Din observed a live-fire demonstration of weapons that the East Germans hoped to market. One was a shortened East German-made Kalashnikov assault rifle that could be equipped with a silencer. The other was a 9-mm Finnish Jatimatic submachine gun that the East Germans recommended for "street fighting." Both would be useful additions to any terrorist's arsenal.

The East German Government also looks to the ANO gray-arms network to help provide weapons for other terrorist groups supported by East Berlin. In early 1984, the East German Government trading company IMES approached Najm al-Din to handle arms sales on its behalf and provide weapons for two radical Palestinian groups, the PFLP-GC and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

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Through ties to the official Polish company CENZIN and arms dealings on behalf of other Palestinian groups, the ANO gray-arms network intersects that of Munzir Qassar.³ Like the ANO, Qassar procures weapons for terrorist groups, falsifies end user certificates, and provides support that obscures the trail back to the Warsaw Pact suppliers. [REDACTED]

Munzir Qassar, a notorious arms and narcotics trafficker, has extensive commercial links to the Polish Government, which provides him with office space, special services, and staff. Qassar is recognized in Warsaw as one of the primary arms brokers for the Polish Government, although he also services other Warsaw Pact governments. Qassar brokers millions of dollars in arms sales and arranges shipping and financing between Warsaw Pact states and various Middle Eastern clients, including terrorist groups. [REDACTED]

Qassar has worked directly with the SAS Company. Documents found in his Alkastronic office in Vienna in 1985 recorded the sale of ammunition and pistols—some equipped with silencers—to SAS in Warsaw. [REDACTED]

Outlook

Recent ANO attacks have been increasingly violent. The hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73, the massacre at the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks suggest that future ANO attacks may cause high numbers of casualties among people with no connection to the Middle Eastern conflict. The ANO continues to espouse violence as the only effective way to achieve a Palestinian homeland in present-day Israel. The ANO's attacks in 1986 continued a trend toward operations designed to cause a maximum number of casualties with no concern for the innocence of the victims. [REDACTED]



Figure 9. Alkastronic office in Vienna, Austria, March 1987 [REDACTED]

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Figure 10. Istanbul, Turkey, 6 September 1986. The interior of Neve Shalom Synagogue attacked by two ANO gunmen; 22 victims died. [redacted] ©

The ANO frequently launches attacks aimed at freeing imprisoned members (see table 3). Banna has publicly threatened the United States with retaliation if it extradites to Israel a Palestinian terrorist operative who claims to belong to Fatah; the operative was arrested in New York in May 1987 on murder charges filed by Israel. In 1986 an ANO political spokesman warned, "Some of our people are imprisoned in Europe. We are going to liberate them before long; that we can guarantee." [redacted]

The ANO has demonstrated its willingness to follow through on its threats. For example, since March 1984, it has conducted a series of bombings and assassinations against British targets in an unsuccessful attempt to force the release of members imprisoned there. The ANO has also sought to intimidate other governments that hold ANO prisoners by conducting attacks against third-party targets on their soil. [redacted]

In addition, the ANO has attempted to negotiate deals with governments that hold its members prisoner. In October 1986 ANO negotiated with Greek officials for the release of three ANO members from prison in return for a pledge that the ANO would refrain from conducting attacks on Greek soil or against Greek targets. Greek Government representatives would not allow overt or covert ANO offices to be opened, but they did concede to a designated ANO representative being permitted to live in Athens and serving as a liaison officer with the Greek Government. In addition, the Greek representatives requested flexibility in timing the release of the ANO prisoners—partly because one of the prisoners is the subject of an extradition request by Italy. [redacted]

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Table 3
Suspected Abu Nidal Members in Custody

Country/Total in Custody	Name	Date of Incident	Sentence (in years)	Remarks
Austria—5	Banij Muhammad Yunis	29 August 1981	20	Jailed for the Vienna synagogue attack. Yunis's 20-year sentence was upheld in October 1985.
	Hisham Rajah		Life	
	Marwan Hasan	27 December 1985	Life	Jailed for the attack at the El Al counter at Vienna's Schwechat Airport.
	Ali Mufleh Abu al-Higah		Life	
	Mahmud Khalil Abdullah Abd Al-Gawad		Life	
Belgium—1	Nasir al-Sa'id	27 July 1980	Life	Jailed for hurling a handgrenade into a group of schoolchildren at a synagogue in Antwerp.
Greece—3	Usama 'Abd al-Hay al-Zumar	22 November 1982	1 2/3	Arrested for possession of explosives.
	Samir Hamit Salamah	30 August 1985	2 1/2	Arrested for planning attack against the Jordanian Ambassador in Athens.
	Amar Mabruki	29 November 1984	10 1/2	Jailed for attempted manslaughter of Jordanian Charge d'Affaires in Athens.
Italy—4	Husayn al-Nawajah	3 April 1985	15	Jailed for firing a light antitank weapon at the Jordanian Embassy in Rome.
	Ahmad Husayn Abu Sereya	16 September 1985	17	Arrested for the attack against the Cafe de Paris in Rome.
	Hasan Itab	25 September 1985	14	Arrested for the bombing of the British Airways office in Rome.
	Muhammad Abdullah Sarham	27 December 1985	... ^a	Arrested for the attack against the El Al counter at Rome's Fiumicino Airport.
Kuwait—1	Mustafa Mahmud Mustafa Sa'id Biyari	11 July 1985	Death	Arrested for the bombings of two cafes in Kuwait City.
Malta—1	Muhammad Ali Abd al-Rizq	23 November 1985	... ^a	Arrested for participation in Egyptair hijacking in Valletta.

Footnote appears at end of table.

~~Secret~~**Table 3 (continued)**

Country/Total in Custody	Name	Date of Incident	Sentence (in years)	Remarks
Pakistan—5	Wahdud Muhammad	5 September 1986	... ^a	Arrested for attempted hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi.
	Hafiz al-Turk		... ^a	
	Zayd Hasan Abd al-La- tif Musud al-Safarini		... ^a	
	Muhammad Abdullah		... ^a	
	Khalil Hussain		... ^a	
	al-Rahayyal		... ^a	
	Jamal Sa'id Abd al-Rahim		... ^a	
Spain—2	Muhammad Ahmad al-Munawar	3 March 1980	24	Jailed for the murder of Spanish attorney Adolfo Cotel Villareal in Madrid.
	Sa'id Ali Salman and an accomplice		24	
Turkey—4	Sami Rushdi Ahmad	24 July 1985	... ^a	Arrested for the murder of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara.
	Washah		... ^a	
	Na'if al-Nadi		... ^a	
	Basim Lutfi Fayiz Sa'id al-Ahmad		... ^a	
	Nader Hasanen Habbush		... ^a	
United Kingdom—4	Husayn Ghassan Sa'id	3 June 1982	30	Jailed for the attempted murder of Israeli Ambassador Argov in London.
	Murwan al-Banna		30	
	Nawaf Nagib Mislih		35	
	Rusan	22 September 1985	25	Arrested for conspiring to cause explosions in London.
	Rasmi Awad		25	
United States—1	Mahmud al-Abid Ahmad (a.k.a. Mahmud Mahmud Ata)	12 April 1986	... ^a	Arrested on provisional arrest warrant, pending extradition to Israel. He is wanted in connection with an attack on a passenger bus at Dayr Abu Mishal junction. (Claims to be member of Fatah.)

^a Individual not yet sentenced.~~This table is Unclassified.~~~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~**Appendix****Chronology of Significant
Abu Nidal Organization
Terrorist Activities, 1974-86****1974****22 November**

United Arab Emirates (UAE): Four terrorists, armed with machineguns, handgrenades, and pistols, hijack British Airways plane en route from Dubayy to Tunis . . . two people wounded during takeover . . . plane took off with approximately 46 hostages; refueled in Tripoli, Libya; and went on to Tunis . . . one passenger killed on ground; hostages later released.

Late 1974

Location unknown; probably Lebanon: Murder planned by Sabri al-Banna against Yasir 'Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and other prominent Palestinian leaders uncovered by Fatah intelligence . . . Banna sentenced to death in absentia in October.

1976**26 September**

Syria: Four terrorists, armed with machineguns and grenades, take over Semiramis Hotel in Damascus, taking 90 hostages . . . Syrian troops storm hotel . . . one terrorist killed and three captured; four hostages killed and 34 wounded.

11 October

Pakistan: Grenade attack on Syrian Embassy and Syrian Ambassador's residence in Islamabad.

17 November

Jordan: Four Palestinians attack Intercontinental Hotel with handguns and grenades, killing two employees and taking hostages . . . Jordanian troops counter-attack, killing three terrorists and wounding one . . . two soldiers, one hotel guest killed; four hotel guests wounded.

2 December

Syria: Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam seriously wounded in assassination attempt in Damascus.

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1977**October**

UAE: Assassination attempt against Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in Abu Dhabi results in death of UAE Minister of State.

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1978**4 January**

United Kingdom: PLO representative murdered in London.

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15 February

Cyprus: Two gunmen attack Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization meeting in Nicosia and kill its secretary general, Yusuf as-Siba'i, a confidant of Anwar El-Sadat . . . leave country on aircraft with 11 hostages but refused permission to land in Libya, Kuwait, Somalia, Ethiopia, or People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) . . . subsequently return to Larnaca Airport . . . Egyptian counterterrorism force conducts airborne assault on airport . . . resulting firefight kills 15 and wounds 16.

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15 June

Kuwait: PLO official murdered in Kuwait City.

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3 August

France: Two gunmen attack PLO office in Paris and kill PLO representative to France.

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~~Secret~~**5 August**

Pakistan: Four gunmen, armed with submachineguns and grenades, attack PLO office in Islamabad and kill radio operator, two Palestinian students, and Pakistani police guard. []

1980**17 January**

France: Manager of Arab bookstore murdered in Paris []

3 March

Spain: Gunman mistakenly shoots and kills Spanish attorney Adolfo Cotel Villareal . . . apparent target is Max Mazin, leader of Spanish Jewish community. []

22 April

Yugoslavia: Attempted murder of Fatah official Salah Khalaf in Belgrade; one bodyguard wounded. []

5 June

Kuwait: Attempted murder of PLO representative in Kuwait City. []

27 July

Belgium: Attack on Agudat Israel synagogue in Antwerp; one person killed and 20 injured. []

1981**1 May**

Austria: Head of Austrian-Israeli Friendship Society killed in Vienna []

1 June

Belgium: PLO representative murdered in Brussels. []

29 August

Austria: Two gunmen, armed with machine pistols and handgrenades, attack Vienna synagogue . . . two killed, 19 injured. []

23 September

Cyprus: Two Arabs attack Israeli shipping firm in Limassol with handgrenades, injuring five employees. []

8 October

Malta: Aborted attempt in Valletta to kill the PLO representative to Libya. []

9 October

Italy: Senior PLO official murdered in Rome. []

1982**4 February**

Austria: Bomb explodes at residence of chief rabbi in Vienna, causing some property damage but no casualties. []

1 March

Spain: Nabil Arnaki, coleader of Arab People's Liberation Movement (APLM), a splinter group of the ANO, killed in Madrid. []

3 June

United Kingdom: Attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London . . . precipitates Israeli invasion of Lebanon. []

5 June

India: First secretary of Kuwaiti Embassy assassinated in New Delhi. []

17 June

Italy: Deputy director of PLO office in Rome murdered. []

9 July

Turkey: President of Palestinian Student Union murdered in Ankara. []

23 July

France: Deputy director of PLO office murdered in Paris. []

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~~Secret~~**9 August**

France: Two gunmen with grenades and automatic weapons attack Jewish-owned restaurant; six killed, 27 wounded [redacted]

23 August

Kuwait: UAE Charge d'Affaires wounded in assassination attempt. [redacted]

26 August

India: UAE Consul General in Bombay escapes injury in assassination attempt. [redacted]

16 September

Pakistan: Attempted assassination of Kuwaiti Consul General in Karachi. [redacted]

18 September

Spain: First secretary of Kuwaiti Embassy assassinated in Madrid, driver wounded [redacted]

9 October

Italy: Grenade and machinegun attack against synagogue in Rome kills a child and wounds 10 persons. [redacted]

8 December

Greece: Kuwait Airways offices bombed in Athens, no casualties [redacted]

1983**10 April**

Portugal: Issam Sartawi, prominent PLO moderate and close friend of 'Arafat's, killed in Lisbon [redacted]

20 August

Greece: Murder of aide to high-ranking Fatah official Khalil al-Wazir [redacted]

23 September

UAE: Gulf Air Boeing 737 en route from Karachi, Pakistan, to Abu Dhabi crashes, killing all 111 passengers and crew . . . crash may have been caused by bomb aboard aircraft [redacted]

25 October

India: Jordanian Ambassador wounded in assassination attempt in New Delhi. [redacted]

26 October

Italy: Jordanian Ambassador and driver wounded in assassination attempt in Rome. [redacted]

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31 October

Jordan: Car bomb detonated outside main Jordanian Army officers' club in Az Zarqa'; no casualties reported. [redacted]

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7 November

Greece: Two security guards of Jordanian Embassy in Athens attacked; one killed, one wounded. [redacted]

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12 November

Jordan: Discovery of car bomb in residential area in Amman. [redacted]

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19 December

Turkey: Car bomb discovered midway between French cultural center and US officers' club in Izmir. [redacted]

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20 December

Turkey: Car bomb injures one person and causes extensive damage to apartment building near PLO office and living quarters in Ankara. [redacted]

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29 December

Spain: Two Jordanian Embassy employees attacked in Madrid; one killed, one wounded. [redacted]

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1984**8 February**

France: UAE Ambassador to France assassinated in Paris [redacted]

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24 March

Jordan: Bomb defused outside British Consulate in Amman [redacted]

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24 March

Jordan: Bomb defused outside British cultural center in Amman [redacted]

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24 March

Jordan: Bomb explodes in parking lot of Intercontinental Hotel across street from US Embassy, damaging two vehicles and slightly injuring two persons; second bomb discovered and defused. []

28 March

Greece: British Embassy first secretary assassinated in Athens []

3 May

Cyprus: Chairman of Arab Writers' Union killed in Nicosia []

25 October

Italy: UAE vice consul wounded and student accompanying him killed in assassination attempt in Rome. []

November

Lebanon: Bomb attack on British Airways office in Beirut. []

12 November

Austria: Bomb partially explodes at Israeli El Al Airlines office; no casualties []

12 November

Austria: Bomb explodes in entrance hallway of British Consulate. []

27 November

India: British Deputy High Commissioner assassinated in Bombay. []

29 November

Greece: Attempted assassination of Jordan's Deputy Chief of Mission in Athens. []

4 December

Romania: Deputy Chief of Mission of Jordanian Embassy assassinated in Bucharest. []

14 December

Italy: Isma'il Darwish, a leading military figure in the Fatah movement, murdered in Rome. []

1985**9 March**

UAE: ANO member arrested for attempted sabotage of Royal Jordanian Airlines flight. []

21 March

Italy: Grenade attack on Royal Jordanian Airlines office in Rome, injuring two. []

21 March

Cyprus: Unidentified man throws two grenades into Royal Jordanian Airlines office in Nicosia. []

21 March

Greece: Grenade thrown into Royal Jordanian Airlines office in Athens, injuring three. []

26 March

Lebanon: British journalist kidnaped in Beirut. []

3 April

Italy: Rocket fired at Jordanian Embassy in Rome . . . misses Embassy and hits apartment on fourth floor of the building, but causes no casualties. []

4 April

Greece: Rocket fired at Jordanian airliner as it takes off from Athens airport . . . projectile hits plane but does not explode []

23 April

Kuwait: Moderate newspaper editor wounded in murder attempt. []

15 May

Lebanon: UN Relief and Works Agency official kidnaped but released the next day. []

1 July

Spain: Bomb explodes at British Airways ticket office in Madrid, also damaging TWA office upstairs . . . Royal Jordanian Airlines ticket office nearby hit by automatic weapons fire and two grenades that fail to explode . . . one killed, 27 wounded. []

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~~Secret~~**11 July**

Kuwait: Two bombs explode within minutes of each other, killing eight and injuring 89 at two cafes about 10 kilometers apart in Kuwait City . . . third bomb defused at another cafe. []

21 July

Lebanon: Bomb explodes outside Kuwaiti Airlines office in Beirut . . . no casualties reported. []

24 July

Turkey: First secretary at Jordanian Embassy assassinated in Ankara. []

8 August

Greece: Bomb explodes in kitchen of London Hotel in Athens, wounding 13 tourists. []

24 August

Turkey: Bomb discovered in PLO office in Ankara. []

30 August

Greece: Palestinian arrested in Athens for plotting assassination of Jordanian Ambassador. []

3 September

Greece: Two grenades thrown at swimming pool at Glyfada Hotel in Athens . . . 19 British tourists wounded. []

16 September

Italy: Grenades thrown at Cafe de Paris in Rome, injuring 38 tourists. []

18 September

Greece: Palestinian magazine publisher murdered in Athens []

22 September

United Kingdom: British authorities arrest an ANO member found in possession of four handgrenades and charge him with conspiracy to cause explosions and to endanger life . . . grenades provided by Libyan contact . . . target identity unknown. []

25 September

Italy: Bomb explodes at British Airways office in Rome, killing one and injuring 14. []

23 November

Malta: Three gunmen seize Egyptair Flight 648 en route from Athens to Cairo and force it to land in Valletta, Malta . . . when hijackers' demand for refueling refused, they begin shooting selected passengers . . . ultimately, 56 passengers and two terrorists killed; 23 passengers and one terrorist wounded . . . on 24 November Egyptian military commando unit storms plane. []

24 November

Jordan: Husayn al-Bitar killed in Amman as a result of financial dispute over his house, which was allegedly owned by Sabri al-Banna []

27 December

Austria: Three gunmen attack El Al counter at Vienna's Schwechat Airport with grenades and AK-47s, killing two and wounding 39 . . . one terrorist also died and two were wounded. []

27 December

Italy: Four gunmen attack El Al ticket counter at Rome's Fiumicino Airport with grenades and AK-47s, killing 12 and wounding 72 . . . three terrorists also died and one was injured. []

1986**5 September**

Pakistan: Four men armed with automatic weapons, handguns, and grenades storm Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, killing 21 and injuring over 100 others. []

6 September

Turkey: Two gunmen attack Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul with grenades and machineguns . . . 22 killed and six wounded. []

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Figure 11
Abu Nidal Organization Activities, 1974-86



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Abu Nidal Organization






Figure 13
Abu Nidal Commercial Network




Polish businessman Andrzej Urbaniak and ANO member Ibrahim al-Abid are directors of the ANO company Interador in Zurich.




Kamal Hasan Khalil managed the ANO's Zibado Company, located in the International Trade Center in East Berlin, before it closed in late 1986.



The most profitable ANO company, SAS Foreign Trade and Investment, is run by Samir Najm al-Din in Warsaw and employs suspected Polish intelligence officer Andrzej Marchewka.




Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadah managed the ANO company in Athens, Al Noor, but may have closed or moved it in early 1987.



The ANO may have closed or moved its company in Nicosia, Al Reem, in early 1987. It was managed by Muhammad Abd al-Fattah al-Salwani.



The ANO owned Al Manar Restaurant, the first Arabic restaurant in Nicosia, but closed it in 1986.



Musa Rashid Ramadan manages the ANO company International Marketing Corporation in Kuwait City.

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